The part ‘Harel’ Brigade carried out in Operation ‘Dani’
At noon on 15 July ‘Harel’s’ artillery began heavy shelling, with cannon and mortar, of the villages and the Positions in the Latrun area in order to get the villagers to flee and abandon their positions, but they avoided shelling ‘Cannon Ridge’, so that the main goal of the attack would not be disclosed.
At noon on 15 July ‘Harel’s’ artillery began heavy shelling, with cannon and mortar, of the villages and the Positions in the Latrun area in order to get the villagers to flee and abandon their positions, but they avoided shelling ‘Cannon Ridge’, so that the main goal of the attack would not be disclosed.
According to the evidence provided by ‘Lusik’, C.O. A Company and Platoon Commander, Dan Cohen, there were a number of defects in the preparations:
1. Only a few officers managed to observe the area, and only for half an hour. Most of the soldiers were unfamiliar with the area.
2. In spite of intending to set out early (since they had learned by experience that when they set out late they ran out of time towards morning) by the time the soldiers left it was almost midnight due to a lack of cars to transport them. The more experienced went out with mixed feelings: the memory of the tough battles which had already taken place in the area of Latrun and the casualties suffered caused the bad feelings. On the other hand they knew that they had an account to settle with Latrun.
The route took about three hours and had ascents and descents, boulders and thorns, all of which made it more difficult to carry machine guns and crates of ammunition. The scouts who were not familiar with the route erred a number of times which caused uncertainty and increased anxiety: were the scouts leading them to the correct Position; would they manage to get there and conduct the battle before dawn? On the final section shots from the Jordanian positions were fired over their heads at another (Battalion) company.
When the first two platoons approached the Position they were given a break for a rest which was used mainly to drink and regroup. When the third platoon arrived – the attack started.
The enemy, the Jordanian Legion, was firmly entrenched and it was difficult to pinpoint their positions. The company commanders roused the soldiers from their rest, organised them and started the assault uphill in the direction of the position. The more the attacking company soldiers advanced and took control of additional positions; the more the Jordanians seemed inclined to abandon their position and retreat towards another one. However, when a position was captured, the company C.O. was unable to report it to the Battalion C.O., because the communications system had been hit.
The enemy commanders decided to launch a counter attack that same night. Two infantry platoon attacks were repelled easily, but then a number of the Legion’s armoured cars neared the position and attacked the company. Because of the premise that it was impossible to reach this position by vehicle (the look-outs had not perceived any way that was not rocky and impassable), to make it easier for the soldiers, no anti-tank weapons were taken with them.
The armoured cars got very near the position and started shelling the dugouts, which alarmed the soldiers and caused them to scatter, since they had no experience of an armoured attack from such close quarters and they had not been prepared for it. The officers were undeterred and led from the front by shooting back at the armoured cars, throwing hand grenades and forcing them to retreat some tens of metres. Thanks to this they managed to get the soldiers back to their positions. Sergeant-Major Yehuda Afirion was an outstanding example; he went from position to position, encouraging the soldiers and helping to tend the wounded.
According to the evidence provided by ‘Lusik’, C.O. A Company and Platoon Commander, Dan Cohen, there were a number of defects in the preparations:
1. Only a few officers managed to observe the area, and only for half an hour. Most of the soldiers were unfamiliar with the area.
2. In spite of intending to set out early (since they had learned by experience that when they set out late they ran out of time towards morning) by the time the soldiers left it was almost midnight due to a lack of cars to transport them. The more experienced went out with mixed feelings: the memory of the tough battles which had already taken place in the area of Latrun and the casualties suffered caused the bad feelings. On the other hand they knew that they had an account to settle with Latrun.
The route took about three hours and had ascents and descents, boulders and thorns, all of which made it more difficult to carry machine guns and crates of ammunition. The scouts who were not familiar with the route erred a number of times which caused uncertainty and increased anxiety: were the scouts leading them to the correct Position; would they manage to get there and conduct the battle before dawn? On the final section shots from the Jordanian positions were fired over their heads at another (Battalion) company.
When the first two platoons approached the Position they were given a break for a rest which was used mainly to drink and regroup. When the third platoon arrived – the attack started.
The enemy, the Jordanian Legion, was firmly entrenched and it was difficult to pinpoint their positions. The company commanders roused the soldiers from their rest, organised them and started the assault uphill in the direction of the position. The more the attacking company soldiers advanced and took control of additional positions; the more the Jordanians seemed inclined to abandon their position and retreat towards another one. However, when a position was captured, the company C.O. was unable to report it to the Battalion C.O., because the communications system had been hit.
The enemy commanders decided to launch a counter attack that same night. Two infantry platoon attacks were repelled easily, but then a number of the Legion’s armoured cars neared the position and attacked the company. Because of the premise that it was impossible to reach this position by vehicle (the look-outs had not perceived any way that was not rocky and impassable), to make it easier for the soldiers, no anti-tank weapons were taken with them.
The armoured cars got very near the position and started shelling the dugouts, which alarmed the soldiers and caused them to scatter, since they had no experience of an armoured attack from such close quarters and they had not been prepared for it. The officers were undeterred and led from the front by shooting back at the armoured cars, throwing hand grenades and forcing them to retreat some tens of metres. Thanks to this they managed to get the soldiers back to their positions. Sergeant-Major Yehuda Afirion was an outstanding example; he went from position to position, encouraging the soldiers and helping to tend the wounded.