Convoys on the roads leading to the Negev and on the Negev roads
The two narrow roads leading to the Negev, passed Arab villages with thick cactus hedges along the sides of the road, enabling the Arabs to attack the vehicles with ease. The unpaved roads in the Negev were mined and in addition, the vehicles encountered heavy fire from the Arabs. At the beginning they had British escorts but their protection was half-hearted. The Palmach armed escorts engaged in heavy fighting that intensified as time went by and they suffered heavy casualties.
The convoys to the Negev transported supplies and fortification materials essential for the survival of the Negev region population and equally important for the deployment of the anticipated war. The convoys were organized in Tel Aviv, passed Rechovot or Kfar Warburg and continued on from there under the armed escort of the 2nd Battalion.
Beyond Julis the road forked, with one road leading to Nir-Am through the Arab villages of Kawkaba, Hulikat and Breir; the second road was the coastal road to Yad Mordehai, through the Arab village of Berbera. From Yad Mordehai to Nir-Am the road passed through the Arab village of Bet Hanun. From Yad Mordehai the road also forked to Gvar-Am through the Arab village of Bet-Jirjya. The roads were narrow and passed through the villages between houses and thick cactus hedges – consequently all the transportation was very vulnerable.
It was in the interests of the Mandatory Government to maintain law and order in the country and primarily to keep the traffic arteries open in the direction of Egypt for their army.
For this reason they took a neutral stand and both the Arab and Jewish convoys had British escorts. These escorts did not prevent the Arabs from attacking our transports and they also did nothing to prevent responses to these attacks.
The British army escorts were useful but inadequate. When a convoy was attacked they did not evacuate the casualties or a vehicle that was hit. These incidents occurred frequently when the British escorted our convoys.
Prior to the 8th of January, there were no attacks on the Jewish convoys that traveled on the Breir - Nir-Am road. After that date and until the middle of February, the Arabs began to shoot at the convoys who then returned fire. There were few casualties.
On the 15th of February, the Muktar of Breir announced that the Jewish convoys would not be allowed to pass. A convoy from Nir-Am ran into some road-blocks and when the fighters tried to remove them, a battle ensued where one of the men was killed and three were wounded. The convoy returned to Nir-Am.
The transport was diverted to the coastal road and continued traveling despite the numerous attacks on the vehicles. In response to the firing while passing Berbera, our convoys fired on an Arab bus that resulted in about 20 casualties. In response, the Arabs dug a ditch across the road in Berbera and mines were detonated under our convoys in different places on the coastal road. The evacuation proceeded under heavy fire, resulting in many casualties. The convoys were frequently obliged to turn back.
From the end of February until the middle of March the convoys resumed their journeys on the Breir – Nir-Am road escorted by the British army. On the 15th of March, the army broke through 2 road-blocks in Breir. On the 16th of March, on their way north, they encountered an impassable ditch, 2 meters wide and 1.6 meters deep, dug across the entire width of the road. The convoy returned to Nir-Am and from there continued to the coastal road through Yad Mordechai and Berbera and then safely back to the north. Afterwards the traffic was diverted to the coastal road again. Barely two days later, the Arabs mined the road south of Berbera, killing a British officer and a sergeant.
Towards the end of March the situation deteriorated even more. Despite the fact that the number of trucks in the convoys was reduced to 15 trucks and the escorts were reinforced with 4 armored vehicles, the roads were mined in many places and heavy fire rained down from Arab bands. Trucks and armored vehicles were hit and the evacuation of casualties under fire resulted in more casualties.
At the end of March and the beginning of April, the battle on the roads in the entire country took a turn for the worse. The last convoy to Nir-Am on the 24.3.1948, arrived at the kibbutz after a heavy battles with many casualties and loss of equipment. An attempt to transfer the convoy from Yad Mordehai to the north on the 26th of March, failed. A convoy to the Negev was organized in Beer-Tuvya, but was unable to pass through.
It took ten days (in which no convoys passed to the Negev), for the scouts from the 2nd Regiment to discover a dirt road that bypassed the villages of Breir, Hulikat and Kawkaba, on their eastern side. From the 4th of April to the 13th of May, over a period of six weeks the traffic passed on that road between Negba and Nir-Am. Many of the vehicles were unable to drive on the difficult terrain and there were a great many break-downs and towing of the vehicles but the convoys were able to go through finally. They were concerned that forces from the villages of Breir and Hulikat might attack the convoys on this road also and therefore they established the settlement of Bror Hayil in the 'Avraham' operation (named for the fighter Avraham Shwartz who fell while escorting a convoy opposite Breir). The settlement of Bror Hayil was designated to form a barrier between the dirt road and the village of Breir.
In a lightning operation, the south and the Negev were connected again.
The villages of Kawkaba, Hulikat and Breir were conquered and their inhabitants fled. The transport to the Negev was diverted to the Kawkaba – Breir – Nir-Am road until the siege was laid on the Negev by the Egyptian forces on the 9.6.48
The convoys on the Negev roads:
The 2nd Battalion escorted convoys from the north to the Negev and within the Negev area with hardly any problems. The difficult problems were in escorting the convoys to Gvar-Am and Kfar Darom where the roads were mined and there was a great deal of heavy gunfire. This situation required forcible breakthroughs at the cost of heavy casualties and loss of equipment and armored vehicles.
When the 8th Battalion was established, the escorted convoys reached Nir-Am, Bet Eshel and Nevatim. It was easier to travel through the coastal road but it passed on the outskirts of Gaza, Dir-el-Balach – Han Yunis. When they too began to attack the transport, they used the dirt roads that passed along the length of the pipeline. However, Kar Darom could only be reached at this stage, through the coastal road.
The Gaza – Beer-Sheba road and the Nitzana – Beer-Sheba – Hebron road both led to Beer-Sheba. When the attacks on the transport to and from Bee-Sheba began, the 8th Regiment was compelled to reroute the convoys to Bet Eshel, Nevatim, Revivim, Hazala and Halutza – on very long unpaved bypass roads.
From the 6.12.47 – 15.1.48, convoys moved on the coastal road to Beer-Sheba escorted by the British army as well. They were attacked by gunfire and there were many casualties. They quickly rerouted to dirt roads; at first they traveled through Saad-Beeri-Tze'elim and later they went through Ruhama-Mishmar Hanegev (the 'starvation' road – that was a low grade road), to Imara and from there to Tze'elim. From Tze'elim, the vehicles were distributed without problems to the western Negev settlements. In moving the convoys to Halutza, Revivim and Hazala, it was necessary to pass sections of the roads where the wheels of the vehicles sank into deep sand.
From Revivim, the vehicles destined for Nevatim and Bet Eshel, went through the Nitzana road, 12-15 kilometers south of Beer-Sheba and from there, indirectly from the east, to Bir Arara and from there westwards to Nevatim and Bet Eshel.
These convoys also encountered mines and gunfire but they were less frequent. By using the long indirect roads they avoided many of the deadly ambushes.
The enormous difficulties in maintaining the Negev region resulted in a serious shortage of food, fuel and other basic supplies.
Beyond Julis the road forked, with one road leading to Nir-Am through the Arab villages of Kawkaba, Hulikat and Breir; the second road was the coastal road to Yad Mordehai, through the Arab village of Berbera. From Yad Mordehai to Nir-Am the road passed through the Arab village of Bet Hanun. From Yad Mordehai the road also forked to Gvar-Am through the Arab village of Bet-Jirjya. The roads were narrow and passed through the villages between houses and thick cactus hedges – consequently all the transportation was very vulnerable.
It was in the interests of the Mandatory Government to maintain law and order in the country and primarily to keep the traffic arteries open in the direction of Egypt for their army.
For this reason they took a neutral stand and both the Arab and Jewish convoys had British escorts. These escorts did not prevent the Arabs from attacking our transports and they also did nothing to prevent responses to these attacks.
The British army escorts were useful but inadequate. When a convoy was attacked they did not evacuate the casualties or a vehicle that was hit. These incidents occurred frequently when the British escorted our convoys.
Prior to the 8th of January, there were no attacks on the Jewish convoys that traveled on the Breir - Nir-Am road. After that date and until the middle of February, the Arabs began to shoot at the convoys who then returned fire. There were few casualties.
On the 15th of February, the Muktar of Breir announced that the Jewish convoys would not be allowed to pass. A convoy from Nir-Am ran into some road-blocks and when the fighters tried to remove them, a battle ensued where one of the men was killed and three were wounded. The convoy returned to Nir-Am.
The transport was diverted to the coastal road and continued traveling despite the numerous attacks on the vehicles. In response to the firing while passing Berbera, our convoys fired on an Arab bus that resulted in about 20 casualties. In response, the Arabs dug a ditch across the road in Berbera and mines were detonated under our convoys in different places on the coastal road. The evacuation proceeded under heavy fire, resulting in many casualties. The convoys were frequently obliged to turn back.
From the end of February until the middle of March the convoys resumed their journeys on the Breir – Nir-Am road escorted by the British army. On the 15th of March, the army broke through 2 road-blocks in Breir. On the 16th of March, on their way north, they encountered an impassable ditch, 2 meters wide and 1.6 meters deep, dug across the entire width of the road. The convoy returned to Nir-Am and from there continued to the coastal road through Yad Mordechai and Berbera and then safely back to the north. Afterwards the traffic was diverted to the coastal road again. Barely two days later, the Arabs mined the road south of Berbera, killing a British officer and a sergeant.
Towards the end of March the situation deteriorated even more. Despite the fact that the number of trucks in the convoys was reduced to 15 trucks and the escorts were reinforced with 4 armored vehicles, the roads were mined in many places and heavy fire rained down from Arab bands. Trucks and armored vehicles were hit and the evacuation of casualties under fire resulted in more casualties.
At the end of March and the beginning of April, the battle on the roads in the entire country took a turn for the worse. The last convoy to Nir-Am on the 24.3.1948, arrived at the kibbutz after a heavy battles with many casualties and loss of equipment. An attempt to transfer the convoy from Yad Mordehai to the north on the 26th of March, failed. A convoy to the Negev was organized in Beer-Tuvya, but was unable to pass through.
It took ten days (in which no convoys passed to the Negev), for the scouts from the 2nd Regiment to discover a dirt road that bypassed the villages of Breir, Hulikat and Kawkaba, on their eastern side. From the 4th of April to the 13th of May, over a period of six weeks the traffic passed on that road between Negba and Nir-Am. Many of the vehicles were unable to drive on the difficult terrain and there were a great many break-downs and towing of the vehicles but the convoys were able to go through finally. They were concerned that forces from the villages of Breir and Hulikat might attack the convoys on this road also and therefore they established the settlement of Bror Hayil in the 'Avraham' operation (named for the fighter Avraham Shwartz who fell while escorting a convoy opposite Breir). The settlement of Bror Hayil was designated to form a barrier between the dirt road and the village of Breir.
In a lightning operation, the south and the Negev were connected again.
The villages of Kawkaba, Hulikat and Breir were conquered and their inhabitants fled. The transport to the Negev was diverted to the Kawkaba – Breir – Nir-Am road until the siege was laid on the Negev by the Egyptian forces on the 9.6.48
The convoys on the Negev roads:
The 2nd Battalion escorted convoys from the north to the Negev and within the Negev area with hardly any problems. The difficult problems were in escorting the convoys to Gvar-Am and Kfar Darom where the roads were mined and there was a great deal of heavy gunfire. This situation required forcible breakthroughs at the cost of heavy casualties and loss of equipment and armored vehicles.
When the 8th Battalion was established, the escorted convoys reached Nir-Am, Bet Eshel and Nevatim. It was easier to travel through the coastal road but it passed on the outskirts of Gaza, Dir-el-Balach – Han Yunis. When they too began to attack the transport, they used the dirt roads that passed along the length of the pipeline. However, Kar Darom could only be reached at this stage, through the coastal road.
The Gaza – Beer-Sheba road and the Nitzana – Beer-Sheba – Hebron road both led to Beer-Sheba. When the attacks on the transport to and from Bee-Sheba began, the 8th Regiment was compelled to reroute the convoys to Bet Eshel, Nevatim, Revivim, Hazala and Halutza – on very long unpaved bypass roads.
From the 6.12.47 – 15.1.48, convoys moved on the coastal road to Beer-Sheba escorted by the British army as well. They were attacked by gunfire and there were many casualties. They quickly rerouted to dirt roads; at first they traveled through Saad-Beeri-Tze'elim and later they went through Ruhama-Mishmar Hanegev (the 'starvation' road – that was a low grade road), to Imara and from there to Tze'elim. From Tze'elim, the vehicles were distributed without problems to the western Negev settlements. In moving the convoys to Halutza, Revivim and Hazala, it was necessary to pass sections of the roads where the wheels of the vehicles sank into deep sand.
From Revivim, the vehicles destined for Nevatim and Bet Eshel, went through the Nitzana road, 12-15 kilometers south of Beer-Sheba and from there, indirectly from the east, to Bir Arara and from there westwards to Nevatim and Bet Eshel.
These convoys also encountered mines and gunfire but they were less frequent. By using the long indirect roads they avoided many of the deadly ambushes.
The enormous difficulties in maintaining the Negev region resulted in a serious shortage of food, fuel and other basic supplies.